Disclosure policy for relative performance indicators under product market competition
研究了在产量竞争且边际成本不对称时，企业关于相对绩效指标的最优披露策略，发现成本高效企业会披露而低效企业不会，并评估了披露政策对社会福利的影响。
This study presents an optimal disclosure policy for relative performance indicators (RPIs) in quantity competition with asymmetric marginal costs. Our analysis shows that an asymmetric equilibrium arises under the specific economic environment, where a cost-efficient firm discloses information, while a cost-inefficient firm does not. Additionally, we evaluate the welfare effects of disclosure policies. Consequently, we find that the regulator should enforce non-disclosure for cost-inefficient firms in moderately-sized markets, as their behavior negatively impacts social welfare, even if they disclose the weight.