Buchanan meets Tullock: aid, contests, and the Samaritan’s Dilemma
研究了利他的第三方在竞争冲突中可能产生的负面作用，发现援助会导致参赛者搭便车，加剧冲突并降低社会福利。
Abstract We analyze the potentially dysfunctional role of altruistic third parties in competitions and conflicts. We build a model in which two Contestants engage in a Tullock contest, each receiving support from a distinct altruistic third party (a Samaritan). In a setting where the Contestants’ and Samaritans’ investments are technological substitutes, we show that the Samaritans’ altruism may create disincentive problems, inducing Contestants to free-ride on their help. This Samaritan’s dilemma, in turn, may increase conflict intensity and reduce social welfare.