Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Compensation Mechanism With Individual Limited Budgets for Minimum Cost Consensus in Social Network
针对绿色供应链中小供应商因预算有限难以达成协作目标的问题，提出一种在个体预算约束下实现社会网络群体共识的框架，通过预算松弛和非对称纳什讨价还价模型公平分配共识成本，并设计基于自我网络的补偿机制，提升合作可行性。
In green supply chain initiatives, small suppliers often struggle to achieve collaborative adjustment goals due to limited budgets, even when overall resources are sufficient. This reflects a common challenge in group decision making (GDM) under individual budget constraints. To address this, a novel framework is proposed for achieving group consensus in social networks with limited individual budgets. First, the minimum cost consensus model (MCCM) is extended by introducing a budget relaxation method to explore the potential of Pareto improvement when strict budget constraints hinder consensus. To realize this potential, an asymmetric Nash bargaining cost allocation model with compensation factors is developed to fairly distribute consensus costs within individual budgets. On this basis, an asymmetric Nash bargaining compensation mechanism in ego-networks is designed, reflecting the reality that in decentralized decision-making scenarios, compensation typically occurs among directly connected individuals due to stronger trust, more frequent interactions, and shared interests. This mechanism enables DM to negotiate and reallocate resources within their local social circles, balancing individual and collective benefits and enhancing the feasibility of cooperation. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is demonstrated through an illustrative example.