Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry
构建并估计了一个劳动和产品市场均存在不完全竞争的模型，利用美国建筑业数据发现，两个市场的不完全竞争导致工资被压低超过30%、价格被抬高约45%，而忽略任一市场的不完全竞争会严重低估市场扭曲程度。
We develop, identify, and estimate a model of imperfect competition in both labor and product markets. Our context is the US construction industry, where firms compete for workers, private market projects, and government procurements. Our empirical approach leverages bidding data from procurement auctions linked to employer-employee tax records. We find imperfect competition in both markets generates a total wage markdown of more than 30 percent and a total price markup of around 45 percent. By contrast, if one erroneously assumed a perfectly competitive product (labor) market, then one would conclude wages (prices) are marked down (up) by only 20 percent (16 percent).