Labor Market Power, Self-Employment, and Development
利用秘鲁数据，研究发现自雇就业削弱了雇主在劳动力市场的定价权，但旨在扩大工资就业的竞争政策可能反而增强雇主势力，对工业发展有重要启示。
This paper shows that self-employment shapes labor market power in low-income countries, with implications for industrial development. Using Peruvian data, we find that wage-setting power increases with employer concentration but less so where self-employment is more prevalent. A general equilibrium model shows that in oligopsonistic labor markets, self-employment raises the supply elasticity of wage labor, weakening employer market power. However, by the same mechanism, procompetitive policies aimed at expanding wage employment and reducing reliance on self-employment may unintentionally strengthen labor market power, undermining their objectives.