CBDC as Imperfect Substitute to Bank Deposits: A Macroeconomic Perspective
在一个银行垄断竞争模型中分析央行数字货币对银行业、公共财政、GDP和福利的影响，发现福利可通过铸币税、降低货币机会成本和减少银行所有者收入三个渠道改善，最大福利提升约50个基点（以消费计）。
Abstract The impact of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is analyzed in a closed‐economy model with monopolistic competition in banking and where CBDC is an imperfect substitute with bank deposits. The design of CBDC is characterized by its interest rate, its substitutability with bank deposits, and its relative liquidity. We examine how interest‐bearing CBDC would affect the banking sector, public finance, GDP, and welfare. Welfare may improve through three channels: seigniorage; a lower opportunity cost of money; and a redistribution away from bank owners. In our numerical analysis, we find a maximum welfare improvement of almost 50 bps in consumption terms.