Supervisory arbitrage and real effects
研究了跨国银行集团的监管套利行为如何影响企业贷款条件和公司业绩，发现当集团在其他国家的风险承担受限时，其子公司会改善对优质和熟悉企业的贷款条件，进而促进企业投资和利润增长。
We examine the effects of cross-border supervisory arbitrage on corporate lending and firm performance. We show that subsidiaries of banking groups improve loan conditions for firms when the group’s opportunities to take risks in other countries are curbed. The expansion in lending is targeted towards firms of higher quality and firms that the group is already familiar with. The improved lending conditions have positive real effects, allowing recipient firms to increase capital spending and leading to higher profits. Taken together, our results suggest that there can be benefits for firms in countries that receive lending inflows due to the supervisory arbitrage.