Corruption stereotype and the unintended consequences of an anti-corruption campaign: evidence from the real estate sector in China
研究发现中国反腐运动后，地方政府因担心被调查而更不愿将土地卖给私营开发商，导致国企购地比例上升，这可能无意中助长了国企的复兴。
In an anti-corruption campaign, government officials have strong incentives to avoid taking actions that may trigger disciplinary investigations. In China’s land sales market, we find that the fraction of residential land parcels purchased by State-Owned-Enterprises (SOE) developers significantly increased after the anti-corruption campaign compared to those purchased by private developers. This result is partly driven by the following mechanism: Because selling land to private developers carries a higher corruption stereotype, local officials, particularly the relatively “clean” ones, become more reluctant to sell land to private developers for the purpose of self-preservation. Thus China’s anti-corruption campaign may have unintentionally contributed to the resurgence of the SOEs. Local officials’ corruption stereotype avoidance in an anti-corruption campaign has broad implications.