Shareholder litigation rights, CEO turnover, and board monitoring
利用美国第九巡回法院的一项意外裁决，研究发现股东诉讼权减弱后，CEO强制更替对业绩的敏感性下降，董事会独立性降低，董事参会减少且外部任职增多，机构投资者监督不足时影响更显著，并导致公司价值下降9.72%。
We investigate how shareholder litigation rights impact CEO turnover decisions and board oversight. We exploit an unexpected court ruling that increased hurdles for shareholders of Ninth Circuit firms to initiate securities class action lawsuits. After the ruling, the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to performance decreases for firms in the Ninth Circuit. Additionally, board independence declines and directors of Ninth Circuit firms attend fewer meetings and hold more external board positions after the decision. These effects are exacerbated in firms that lack monitoring from institutional shareholders. For firms dependent on shareholder litigation, the reduction in litigation rights was economically significant and led to a 9.72 % decline in firm value.