Relative Performance Evaluation and Strategic Competition
研究了相对绩效评估（RPE）如何影响行业竞争，利用美国航空业数据估计寡头市场中异质企业间的动态博弈，发现RPE在小市场加剧竞争，在中型市场削弱竞争，对大型高利润市场影响不大。
Abstract We examine how relative performance evaluation (RPE) affects industry competition—a question relevant for corporate boards interested in incentivizing executives. Using U.S. airline data, we estimate a dynamic game of competition between heterogeneous firms in an oligopolistic market, with managers incentivized by RPE contracts. While RPE can induce a firm to compete more intensely by smoothing compensation, it also amplifies a firm’s cost efficiency relative to its peers and can weaken competition from inefficient firms. The first effect dominates in small markets and the second in median-sized markets. RPE has little effect in large, highly profitable markets.