Societal Inequality and Bank Deposit Dynamics: Evidence from the Freedman’s Savings Bank
利用美国内战后为支持前奴隶而设立的自由民储蓄银行的数据，研究发现白人储户在利率提高后大量涌入，并在银行危机前更快撤资，将损失转嫁给作为主要慈善目标的黑人储户，揭示了存款资金如何对经验不足的借款人造成系统性劣势。
Abstract We study depositor behavior and capital flight using data from the Freedman’s Savings Bank, a bank established after the U.S. Civil War to support formerly enslaved individuals. White depositors, who generally had better access to financial information, begin providing significant funding as interest terms are enhanced. They respond faster to postpanic stabilization efforts and negative bank-specific information, and are twice as likely to close accounts before failure, passing expected losses to Black depositors, who were the bank’s primary philanthropic target. Our results show how demand deposit funding of bank-like institutions can create systemic disadvantages for less experienced borrowers.