Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics
研究了企业使用可能偏误的算法估计需求时，均衡中广告效果被高估导致过度支出，价格弹性被低估导致定价过高，并比较了朴素分析均衡与纳什均衡的利润。
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity that is estimated by analytics algorithms. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly optimal strategies based on estimates from possibly biased analytics algorithms, and (2) the levels of biases form best replies to one another. In equilibrium the firms' algorithms overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically, which causes advertisers to overspend. In price competitions firms also underestimate price elasticities and set prices too high. In games with strategic complements (substitutes), profits induced by such “naive analytics” equilibria Pareto dominate (are dominated by) those induced by the Nash equilibrium.