The Effect of Conflict of Interest Disclosures on Misselling: Evidence from the Dutch Mortgage Industry
研究荷兰2009年强制披露抵押贷款佣金政策的效果，发现该政策减少了高风险销售与中介佣金依赖的关联，但中介转向销售非披露产品，提示政策需考虑副作用。
Abstract Conflicts of interest are pervasive in the financial industry. Globally, policymakers are seeking ways to limit such conflicts and curb the resulting misselling of financial products. This study investigates the effects of a prominent policy instrument: the mandatory disclosure of financial intermediaries’ mortgage commissions. Using unique confidential regulatory data, we evaluate the mandatory commission disclosure of mortgage sales that was implemented in the Netherlands in 2009. We find that, contrary to some predictions based on prior experimental research, the association between risky sales and intermediaries’ commission-dependency decreased after the introduction of disclosure regulation, indicating reduced misselling. More commission-dependent intermediaries experienced relative decreases in mortgage revenues, but also show a relative increase in revenues from non-disclosure products, indicating a shift of focus to these products. This suggests that while disclosure policies may contribute to mitigating conflicts of interest, policymakers also need to consider possible adverse effects of disclosure regulations on non-substitutable products in firms’ product portfolios.