Strategic Mutual Fund Tournaments
研究了多期多竞争者锦标赛中共同基金的最优风险承担策略，发现领先者仅在领先优势足够大时才会降低风险以锁定优势，而追赶者不会增加风险。实证支持了该理论。
Abstract We characterize optimal mutual fund risk-taking strategies in competitive multi-period tournaments among multiple players. With multiple competitors, every player begins by taking maximum risk. In the final period, all players continue to take maximum risk except the leading player, who employs a “lock-in” strategy that depends on the magnitude of the lead. Our theory predicts the leader should strategically lock in advantage by reducing risk-taking if and only if the lead is great enough, rather than an increase in risk-taking by the trailers to try to catch up. Empirical evidence from style-adjusted mutual fund tournaments provides strong and robust support.