Beliefs, credence goods and information campaigns
研究在信任品模型中，关于专家诚实度的信念如何影响福利，并探讨透明度与信息宣传活动对最优信念和诚实行为的作用。
We study the role of beliefs about experts’ honesty in a credence goods model with second opinions. The welfare-maximizing belief generally differs from the actual share of honest experts and exceeds the belief that maximizes honest behavior. Transparency, defined as experts’ awareness of opinion order, shapes the optimal belief and may enhance or hinder honest behavior. Incorporating beliefs and transparency into the standard model opens the door to interesting policy implications, like the opportunity for a public authority to release an information campaign that affects people’s beliefs. We identify conditions under which the costless revelation of the share of honest experts improves welfare, showing that they are independent of initial belief accuracy.