The more you have, the less you do: analyst coverage and innovation efficiency
研究1990-2018年美国上市公司发现，分析师覆盖与创新效率呈倒U型关系：适度覆盖通过减少信息不对称提升效率，过度覆盖则因短期压力和知识泄露降低效率，且受技术标准组织和市场竞争影响。
This study examines the impact of financial analyst coverage on firms’ innovation efficiency using a comprehensive dataset of U.S. publicly listed firms from 1990 to 2018. Our findings reveal a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship, indicating that moderate analyst coverage enhances innovation efficiency by reducing information asymmetry and improving managerial accountability, whereas excessive coverage hampers efficiency due to short-term pressures and knowledge leakage. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this curvilinear relationship is contingent on external institutional and competitive factors. Specifically, participation in technological standard-setting organisations (SSOs) and product market competition amplify both the benefits and drawbacks of analyst coverage, reinforcing the non-linear effect. By bridging the literature on financial intermediation and innovation management, this study provides valuable insights for managers, investors, and policymakers seeking to optimise analyst coverage and enhance innovation efficiency, ultimately contributing to long-term economic growth.