Equilibrium and social norms
推广了Richter-Rubinstein的社会规范模型，允许无限代理人、个性化选择集、外部性和非传递偏好，并研究了可行帕累托有效配置的社会福利性质，适用于中央计划经济、瓦尔拉斯交换经济和社会规范形成等例子。
Richter-Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.