The effects of tenure-track systems on selection and productivity in Economics
利用意大利2010年改革，发现终身教职制度减少了经济学博士进入国内学术界，但增加了出国或进入私营部门，且高能力者更易流失，不过获得终身教职者发表更多顶级期刊论文。
This paper examines how publication-based tenure-track systems affect the careers of Ph.D. graduates in Economics. We leverage a 2010 reform in Italy that replaced open-ended assistant professor (AP) positions with fixed-term contracts and introduced publication minimum requirements for career advancement. Using survey and administrative data, along with a Difference-in-Differences Event-Study approach comparing Economics to less academically-oriented fields, we find that the reform significantly reduced the likelihood of Economics Ph.D. graduates entering academia in Italy, while increasing transitions to academic careers abroad or to public and private sector jobs. Talented graduates were disproportionately affected, revealing negative selection into Italian academia following the removal of permanent AP positions. Despite these trends, tenure-track hires tend to publish more in high-ranking journals, suggesting that the reform’s incentive effects may partly mitigate its negative selection effects. • Tenure-track reform reduced Ph.D. entry into Italian academia. • Low-SES graduates were more likely to leave academia. • Top Ph.D.s increasingly pursued academic careers abroad. • Tenure-track hires published more in top journals. • Reform’s incentive effects partly offset negative selection.