From Pitch Perfect to Epic Fail: The Green Parties and the Green Deal in the European Elections
本文分析绿党在2019年和2024年欧洲选举中的表现差异，发现绿党在2024年选举中未能有效利用绿色新政的成就来动员选民，其竞选框架重复且缺乏实施重点，导致支持率下降。
After achieving their most successful result at the 2019 European Parliament elections, Green parties sustained relevant losses in 2024 that took them back to their electoral performance in 2014. Some may argue that 2019 was the exception from the usual support that Green parties enjoy in the European elections. Such an exception could be due, amongst others, to increasing levels of awareness and concern about the threats of climate change and environmental degradation, to their absence from national governments (Pearson and Rüdig, 2020) or to national electoral contexts (Han and Finke, 2023). Others may claim that the overall loss of support in 2024 was mainly driven to the poor electoral performance of the French and German Greens that lost eight and nine seats compared to 5 years before. In spite of these valid arguments, there are at least two elements that raise question marks about the general loss of votes by the European Greens in 2024. First, the European agenda was favourable to the Green parties because the EU Commission presented in December 2019 the European Green Deal. This was a series of measures and policies aiming to transform the EU into a resource-efficient economy and climate-neutral by 2050. This provided the ideal platform on which Green parties could mobilise the electorate. Second, several newly formed Green parties gained more seats in 2024 compared to 2019. The emergence of these parties followed two distinct patterns: on the one hand, they consolidated their presence in established strongholds, notably Volt in Germany and the Netherlands, where green issues were already salient amongst voters. On the other hand, they managed to gain traction in countries where their political footprint has traditionally been marginal, as evidenced by the growing support for We Can! in Croatia, Green Europe in Italy and the Progressives in Latvia. Equally important, apart from the French and the German Greens, other parties from the traditional Northern and Western European Green strongholds succeeded to mobilise their supporters to similar extent. Some of the these, such as the Swedish Greens, augmented their electoral support whilst others such as the Dutch Green Left maintained their previous performance. This change in electoral support has been partially explained by a relative decline in the salience of climate issues against the backdrop of a cost-of-living crisis across the EU, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the corresponding impacts on energy prices (Goldthau and Youngs, 2023). There are other explanations for national-level backlash against green policies, often driven by right-wing populist parties that mobilised against the climate and energy transitions and that made major gains during the 2024 European election (Mudde, 2024). At EU level, possible explanations include the slow implementation of the Green Deal, the comprehensive plan aimed at making Europe the first continent with zero climate impact and its contestation by several political actors. Green Deal legislation was adopted in July 2021 (the EU Climate law) but had its first actions just before the 2024 elections (Bocquillon, 2024). The implementation of the Green Deal legislation requires major investments the European institutions, member states and citizens are expected to contribute greatly. This determined several political actors such as the European People's Party to contest a range of provisions in the Green Deal legislation (Tosun, 2023). All these developments led several commentators to question whether the ambitious environmental policies launched under the European Green Deal umbrella since 2019 can be sustained in the parliament elected in 2024 (Bocquillon, 2024; Sandmann et al., 2024). Until now, the Greens' policy agenda in the 2024 term in office remains largely committed to the Deal but shows less enthusiasm, substance and concrete ways of action compared to the previous term. This article argues and brings evidence to illustrate that the ways in which the Green parties in Europe framed Green Deal policies in the run up to the 2019 and 2024 elections could explain this electoral change. A framing analysis of their manifestos for the European elections shows that in 2019, many Green parties adapted well to the changing political and economic circumstances and presented different strategies to influence the environment and climate agenda. In 2024, although such an agenda was set and some actions were taken, many Green parties failed to capitalise on the achievements and frame the discussion around the required implementation of policies although they spoke considerably more about the climate policies. The messages were repetitive (as in 2019) and focused on less salient issues that were sometimes difficult to grasp. They criticised the Green Deal or tried to move to another topic whilst leaving the Green Deal unfinished. These trends are also related to the diversification of Greens' policy agenda, which had to account for health, conflict, human rights and foreign policy issues. The next section discusses the developments of the European Green Deal and its politicisation. The second section briefly describes the data and methodology used in the analysis. Next, the article presents the main findings and identifies three potential reasons for which the Greens had a limited electoral mobilisation. The article concludes with several main takeaways from this analysis and the general implications for the Green performance in elections. The origins of EU environmental policy go back to the early 1970s (Jordan and Gravey, 2021), and the first developments of the policy in the EU could be traced back to the 1990s (Dupont et al., 2024). The concept of Green Deal goes beyond the EU and entered the mainstream discourse 1 year before the 2008 US presidential elections when an op-ed argued that the candidate with an articulated environment and energy agenda would have the upper hand in the race (Friedman, 2007). In 2013, the UK government adopted a Green Deal policy intended to deliver housing energy efficiency. The programme was a failure due to reasons of policy design, limited financial appeal and narrow engagement with consumers (Rosenow and Eyre, 2016). It was terminated two and a half years after its launch. In 2019, the US House of Representatives was presented with a resolution drafted by one congresswoman and one senator about a climate crisis by achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a 10-year mobilisation (Mastini et al., 2021). The European Green Deal was presented in December 2019 by the president of the European Commission as a transformative agenda that included a set of policy initiatives to reduce the net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, to reach climate-neutrality by 2050, make the EU economy sustainable including support for clean products and technologies, ensure a just and inclusive transition and encourage a transformative transportation system. The funding for Green Deal would amount to approximately €1 trillion, with details about the fund mobilisation being presented 1 month later in the form of the European Green Deal Investment Plan. In spite of several financial and legal challenges (Sikora, 2021), the European Climate Law was adopted in 2021 to ensure that the EU policies contribute to the European Green Deal goals and that the economies and societies of member states are engaged in the process. In the 2019–2024 term in office of the von der Leyen Commission, the climate legislation has been the main achievement of the European Green Deal. The European Parliament, a strong advocate for EU environmental policies over time (Burns, 2019), declared climate emergencies and debated about the European Green Deal. It offers a unique transnational public sphere for argumentation and justification, identification of climate change problems and consequences, the discussion of potential solutions or the arena to make claims on behalf of citizens' interests (Kinski and Servent, 2022). Previous findings about these debates show that parliamentarians cover a broad range of themes from intra-EU distribution or global distribution of responsibilities for climate change to just transition, environmental degradation to the EU's international role or critiques of supranational policies (Pollex, 2025). Whilst the European Green Deal can be connected in general to representation and democracy (Buzogány et al., 2025), the politicisation of climate issues is particularly relevant for both policy adoption and in the context of elections. For policy adoption, the politicisation of climate change resulted, amongst others, in the reluctance of member states' governments to meet the European Green Deal targets (Witajewska-Baltvilka et al., 2024). In the electoral arena, the Green parties that emerged three or four decades ago as single-issue political actors were characterised by concerns for the environment. They gradually developed their policy positions to cover other areas, but remain prominent on environment (van Haute, 2016). The Green parties formed in the most recent decade start their existence as multi-issue parties with strong focus on climate change but addressing other issues such as equality, migration, education or health, for example, We Can! in Croatia. However, the Greens do (no longer) have a monopoly on the environment-related topics. In national elections, many social democratic or liberal parties approach the climate issues, whilst in the run up to the 2019 elections, the ALDE and PES party groups had ‘greener’ than usual manifestos (Biedenkopf et al., 2023). In general, the European Green Deal was supported – at least mildly – by those who are not active climate change deniers (Keary, 2024). In the opposite camp, we find most of the right-wing populist parties that do not support climate change action, including the European Green Deal, and many of them deny the existence of climate change in close connection with their distrust in institutions and science (Kulin et al., 2021). The populist hostility to climate change policies is rooted both in their belief that people were affected by structural changes of globalisation including job loss and in the idea that climate change is the product of an illegitimate and corrupt elite (Lockwood, 2018). However, the picture is more since there are some right-wing populist parties in Europe that support some of energy (Lockwood, 2018). 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There are in which the Green parties in their 2024 manifestos to the implementation of policies included in the Green Deal, which could have been the next in the discussion about the climate change. such from that the European level, we ensure the implementation of the Green Deal and the achievement of a 55% greenhouse gas by 2030, with a to achieving by 2050, as provided for in the European Climate and from Green Europe that argues do not that the Green is but is to to the and an social The second approach used by many Green parties in their 2024 manifestos was the focus on issues that are difficult to or have In to the 2019 messages that focused on the such a frame in and of climate change or environment such are the to include emissions and to cover at least of emissions in the EU by the of Netherlands, or EU emissions and rights that are for Greens, 2024). parties for that could be of to the For example, the to the of sustainable and energy that offers as and as Whilst and are for democratic their with energy is in the absence of similar several Green parties the idea of funding that could support the policy implementation in these but the discussion details that could the people about the of such For example, the Dutch Green Left about the to the Climate and to ensure that the most but this is presented as an than in connection with other the German Greens argues that and climate could be by to the programme of the European Commission, but with limited about they can be to be particularly with the Green Deal. we to and the The frame of the 2024 manifestos was a of the European Green Deal that a of its These critiques several problems such as the failed the to the or legal provisions and slow for the about failed from the Greens policy of the Green to reduce and also in of The People's Party an for the limited of the policy energy crisis and the for have that the EU's climate policy is from for the for and the EU's climate targets to be with a to increasing both and The limited is criticised also by the European Greens the that to policy Volt Germany that argues that policies could and Volt that the as a of and for climate than on the policy implementation that could the discussion at next level, the European Greens about the to the legal less than years after their can and to go beyond a 55% in emissions by and climate by These be set in a EU climate In the they to the of the measures for the climate agenda as being and which the of policy implementation than the of a legal The and the one with the is from the European Green Deal to other The European Greens show in their when about the EU to make Green Deal with and actors to support the Green Deal with to and in the context in which they criticised the Green Deal for being ambitious and for on similar the about the Green and Deal, the the social of such a the Greens developed their to capitalise on developments in their main of on issues on which they have This is of a since they are at strong around developments in the of democracy and 2025). This article aimed to illustrate that the framing used by the Green political parties the European Green Deal policies could explain they lost votes in 2019 compared to 2024. At a such a loss was since the Greens to gain with the of the European Green Deal and the adoption of climate legislation in the previous term in The also to go in their since some of the and included to climate action and environment. In a first the politicisation of climate change by the actors the start of the process. In a second the politicisation driven by of climate change its before the 2024 election (Dupont et al., 2024). The 2024 in electoral appeal can be explained also through the used by the Greens in that election when addressing climate change and energy years they set by and strategies about policies to be adopted with on the of such policies. In 2024, the Green parties not make of the favourable circumstances and their to make a for There were in which the parties presented the European Green Deal as a in which the legislation was adopted first and there was the time for policy many political parties the from 2019 or critiques to the the limited The of was with about issues and with to move beyond the European Green Deal when this was unfinished. This of was in the Greens' in the Parliament elected in 2024. In over 1 July they had in which they the European Green Deal such as the one in which they the at the of took in but that are related to a limited to Green migration, human rights or foreign and and economic the 2024 and Greens' actions since show a agenda in the European Parliament, which at the of engagement with the European Green Deal. The for the Deal are that the European People's Party their from of these brings the to an For the time the European Green Deal and to although some of its supporters have their The European People's Party and the the Green parties lost overall there are several Some of the newly formed parties gained seats for the first time in the 2024 European election in their of those countries in which they emerged are not traditional strongholds for Green which growing concern about climate change and environment. The 2024 election may as a that could the of messages about the Green Deal and its The policy implementation in the years be because can a and for the Greens' discourse they to be their would to those who with the data and for their and to the of the for their and support the process.