Strategic Behavior by Equity Lenders
研究发现股票出借人利用市场信息，通过调整借贷费用中的溢价或折扣来最大化收入，这对理解知情卖空、空头头寸和交易成本有新的启示。
We document that stock lenders are informed about market conditions and pursue revenue maximization by setting premiums or offering discounts on stock loan fees. Using a model of supply and demand in the equity lending market, we illustrate the effect of stock borrowers’ private information on the elasticity of shorting demand. Strategic lenders respond to demand elasticity and increase their revenues through premiums or discounts on lending fees. Empirically, decomposing stock loan fees into intrinsic fee and premium or discount, we confirm lenders’ strategic behavior, showing that premiums and discounts among difficult-to-borrow stocks lead to increased lending revenues. This strategic lending behavior has new implications about informed shorting, short interest, and transaction costs in the equity lending market. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03270 .