Effectiveness of Term Limits Combating Administrative Corruption
利用葡萄牙2013年市政选举中市长任期限制的外生断点，发现任期限制显著减少了公务员的行政腐败，机制是缩短了非法交易的预期持续时间。
ABSTRACT This paper examines how mayoral term‐limit rules shape the corrupt behavior of career public servants. Using the exogenous discontinuity created by Portugal's 2013 municipal elections, where some incumbents were constitutionally barred from reelection while otherwise similar peers could run again, I compare corruption‐related infractions committed by public servants across all mainland Portuguese municipalities. The analysis suggests a large decrease in administrative corruption among public servants when the mayor is term‐limited. These patterns fit a “shrinking horizon” mechanism: As a mayor approaches a mandatory exit, the expected duration of illicit exchanges collapses, dampening the willingness of public servants to collaborate. The results are robust to several alternative specifications, providing fresh evidence that term limits may serve as an effective governance tool to reduce the search for rents by public servants.