Too much of a good thing? Using tax incentives to stimulate dual-earner couples
研究了荷兰通过税收激励鼓励双职工夫妇的政策是否过度，发现改革后社会福利权重不再随家庭收入单调递减，甚至对特定单职工家庭出现负权重，表明系统不再帕累托最优。
Abstract Following major tax-benefit reforms over the past decades, the Netherlands is an international front-runner in stimulating dual-earner couples via the tax system. We consider whether or not these tax incentives have perhaps gone too far. Using the inverse optimal tax method, our results indicate that the reforms resulted in social welfare weights that are no longer monotonically declining in household income, which is hard to rationalize with social welfare weights based solely on household income. However, this could be rationalized by other factors like preference heterogeneity between households or “affirmative feminist” social preferences. More challenging is our finding that the social welfare weights have become negative for single-earner couples with children 0–3 years of age, which suggests that the system is no longer Pareto optimal.