Local Corporate Taxes and the Geography of Foreign Multinationals
研究外国跨国公司对地区企业税政策的影响，利用中国2008年税改发现企业跨区域生产比跨国更易流动，模拟显示税改使外国生产转向西部并提升福利0.86%，但地区税收竞争会降低福利5.56%。
Abstract We study the implications of the presence of foreign multinationals on regional corporate tax policies of a country. We develop and estimate a quantitative spatial model with multinational production (MP) and local corporate taxes. Exploiting China's 2008 corporate tax reform, we find that firm production across regions is twice as footloose as estimates in the literature on cross-country production. Counterfactual analysis shows that (i) China's 2008 corporate tax reform shifted foreign-firm productions to western provinces and increased Chinese welfare by 0.86%; (ii) regional tax competition would significantly reduce China's corporate tax revenue, lowering the welfare by 5.56%; (iii) the nationally optimal corporate tax schedule would increase Chinese welfare by 3.10%. Finally, without the presence of foreign multinationals, the welfare loss from regional tax competition would be 2.04%, while the gain from the nationally optimal corporate taxes would be only 0.06%.