Incentivizing Efficient Effort When Monitoring Individuals Is Costly
提出一种混合机制，通过群体目标奖励与可选个体监测结合，在无需实际监测成本的情况下激励污染者群体中的个体最优减排努力，实验证实其福利优于纯群体激励或强制个体监测。
We propose and explore, both in theory and the laboratory, a mechanism to incentivise optimal individual abatement effort in groups of polluters when individual-level monitoring is costly. The mechanism we propose is a hybrid; rewarding agents for the achievement of a group-level target, while allowing individuals to protect themselves against coordination failure by electing to purchase individual-level monitoring. By exerting optimal individual effort, a monitored agent can guarantee their reward irrespective of group behaviour. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium is characterised by group members exerting optimal levels of individual effort whilst not purchasing monitoring. Thus, the hybrid mechanism disincentivises free riding without realising monitoring costs. Laboratory experiments confirm that the hybrid mechanism offers welfare gains compared to standalone lump-sum group-level incentives and instruments mandating individual-level monitoring. Moreover, the hybrid mechanism maintains levels of efficiency comparable to a group tax, but with more desirable out-of-equilibrium properties.