An Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Dynamic Multi‐Item Auction Under Budget Constraints
针对竞拍者有单位需求、准线性偏好和硬预算约束的情形，提出一种高效且激励相容的动态拍卖机制，能产生核心且强帕累托有效的结果，无预算约束时实现最小均衡价格的瓦尔拉斯均衡。
ABSTRACT This paper proposes an efficient and incentive‐compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods when bidders have unit demand, quasi‐linear preferences, and hard budgets. Valuations and budgets are private information. The auction generates an efficient outcome that is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. When no bidder is budget‐constrained, the auction returns a Walrasian equilibrium with the minimal equilibrium prices.