Liquidity Crises and the Market‐Maker of Last Resort
研究非基本面冲击下市场流动性不足的问题，通过分散化议价模型发现多重理性预期均衡，政府作为最后做市商购买资产可改善福利，并比较了激进与保守两种政策的效果。
Abstract We study market illiquidity in an economy subject to nonfundamental shocks. Asset trading occurs via decentralized bargaining. The model has multiple rational expectations equilibria; we associate certain Pareto‐inferior equilibria with liquidity crises. The government can improve welfare by acting as a “market‐maker of last resort” (MMLR), purchasing assets at above‐market prices. Several policies employed by the United States during the financial crisis are examples of MMLR. We consider “aggressive” and “conservative” MMLR policies. The aggressive policy supports the unique Pareto‐optimal equilibrium. The conservative policy, which embeds a “no‐bailout constraint,” only supports an inefficient equilibrium.