Endogenous cool-off periods
通过最后通牒博弈实验，研究提议者能否主动对回应者施加等待期（冷静期），发现40%的提议者选择这样做，且出价更低，冷静期并未提高接受率，反而损害了回应者的收益。
We run an ultimatum game experiment where cool-off periods can emerge endogenously, that is, where proposers can decide to impose a waiting period on responders. Previous research focused on cool-off periods that were exogenously imposed by the researcher, but in real life people can make deliberate choices to impose such periods on others for strategic reasons. Since in our experiment cool-off periods can be imposed endogenously, we can answer several novel research questions. First, how willing are individuals to impose endogenous cool-off periods on others? Second, do offers change if cool-off is an option? Third, are endogenously imposed cool-offs effective? Finally, how does the possibility of imposing an endogenous cool-off period affect bargaining breakdowns and earnings? We find that 40% of proposers choose to impose a cool-off period on responders. Proposers make significantly lower offers when they can impose a cool-off period on responders. Endogenous cool-off periods are not effective in increasing the overall acceptance rate. The possibility to create an endogenous cool-off period does not have a significant effect on bargaining breakdowns or earnings overall. However, it lowers responder earnings significantly, as it allows proposers to exploit the timing choice to make a lower offer. Our results highlight that instead of helping to solve conflicts, the possibility to create cool-off periods hurts the less powerful party.