Optimal insurance design under limited liability
研究了在有限责任下，投保人面临不同限制的保险合同时的最优保险需求，发现无限制时最优为部分保险，递增赔偿时最优为有上限免赔额，而仅递增赔偿时合同结构更丰富。
Abstract We study optimal demand for insurance in a classical expected utility setting where the insured party has limited liability and has access to three different types of progressively more restrictive contracts. At one end, with no restrictions on the indemnity schedule, it is optimal to fully insure certain losses while leaving others uninsured. At the other end, if indemnity schedules and retained losses are assumed to be increasing functions of the underlying loss, the optimal insurance policies are shown to be capped deductibles. For the intermediate case when the indemnity schedule is only an increasing function of the loss, we find that optimal contracts exhibit a richer structure beyond the capped policies suggested in earlier literature. Our study extends and provides a unifying perspective on the existing literature on optimal insurance under limited liability.