Status-Amplified Deterrence: Paul Manafort’s Prosecution Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
研究提出“地位放大威慑”理论，以美国司法部起诉高地位人物马纳福特违反《外国代理人登记法》为例，发现该执法通过媒体和合规顾问的营销，显著减少了广泛的不合规行为。
Social control agents often struggle to deter organizational deviance. We propose a theory of “status-amplified deterrence” wherein enforcement’s deterrent effects are amplified when carried out against high-status organizational actors. First, this enforcement is interpreted as willingness and ability for far-reaching enforcement. Next, amplified deterrence occurs as these episodes become widely known through (1) extensive media coverage and (2) the marketing efforts of third-party compliance advisors. We examine this theory in the context of the U.S. Department of Justice’s enforcement against Paul Manafort for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Using a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate that enforcement against Manafort caused a widespread, sustained, and economically significant reduction in FARA noncompliance. We show supplementary evidence consistent with the idea that deterrence was amplified in significant part by media attention and by law firms referencing the episode while successfully marketing FARA advisory services. We contribute to literature illuminating how organizations, in conjunction with third-party compliance advisors, adjust deviant activities in response to shifting regulatory environments. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2024.18754 .