Delayed Sowing in Response to Early‐Maturing Maize Bundled With Germination Index Insurance
研究肯尼亚农民如何因早熟抗旱玉米种子与发芽降雨保险的捆绑产品而调整播种时间，发现重复使用者倾向于更晚、更集中的播种，从而增加发芽期降雨、减少保险赔付，形成一种提升福利的“正向道德风险”。
ABSTRACT Using a unique panel of geolocated and time‐stamped data, we study how Kenyan farmers adjust sowing timing in response to a novel de‐risking bundle of early‐maturing drought‐tolerant maize seed and germination rainfall insurance. We find that repeat users of this bundle tend to plant later and in a tighter timeframe, a behavioral pattern consistent with learning about and trusting the early maturation trait of the seed. On average, these on‐farm adjustments result in more rainfall received during the ensuing maize germination stage and, consequently, decreased total insurance payouts. This behavioral adjustment to new protection against drought risk thus appears to be a “positive moral hazard” response that increases overall welfare.