Venture Capital and Private M&A Contracting
研究了风险投资公司在私募并购合同中如何减少信息不对称，发现风险投资参与时对赌协议使用更少，且与买方的先前关系进一步降低对赌依赖。
This study investigates the role of venture capital (VC) firms in private mergers and acquisitions (M&A) contracting, particularly in reducing information asymmetry. Analyzing a proprietary data set of 851 startup acquisitions from 2015 to 2020, I find that M&A contracts are significantly less likely to include earnouts, mechanisms designed to mitigate information asymmetry, when a VC is involved in the transaction. Further analysis reveals that earnouts are more likely in transactions with high information asymmetry between the VC and the buyer. The study also examines the effect of prior relationships between VCs and buyers, showing that these connections not only increase the chances of repeat transactions but also further reduce the reliance on earnouts. These findings suggest that VCs play a crucial role in mitigating information asymmetry, reducing the need for earnouts, and ultimately improving M&A outcomes. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Funding: Research funding was provided by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00654 .