Divisional Managers and Corporate Disclosure Quality
研究美国公司部门经理与CEO或CFO的共事经历如何通过改善内部沟通提升外部信息披露质量，包括更准确的盈利预测、更低的股价崩盘风险和更少的应计盈余管理。
ABSTRACT Using a large sample of US firms, we study the role of divisional managers in corporate disclosure quality. We find that when a company's divisional managers have previously worked with the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief financial officer (CFO) at other companies, in other words, they have co‐working experience, the company produces more accurate management earnings forecasts, experiences lower future stock price crash risks, and engages in less accrual‐based earnings management, consistent with the notion that co‐working experience facilitates internal communication, which, in turn, improves external disclosure quality. Moreover, the information‐enhancing role of the co‐working experience is more pronounced for firms with greater organizational complexity, more opaque internal information environments, and CEOs or CFOs who are relatively new to their positions. Overall, our results provide new insight into the role of divisional managers in shaping corporate disclosure and transparency.