Backward Induction Reasoning beyond Backward Induction
针对不完全信息博弈，提出了非均衡解概念“逆向可理性化”，提炼逆向归纳推理的逻辑，并展示其性质与应用，包括新版同行确认均衡。
Backward induction (BI) is only defined for perfect information games, but its logic is also invoked in many concepts for imperfect or incomplete information games. Yet, the meaning of BI reasoning is not clear in these settings, and we lack a way to capture the essence of BI without assuming equilibrium. We introduce backward rationalizability, a nonequilibrium solution concept for incomplete information games, which we argue distills the logic of BI reasoning. We show several of its properties and discuss a few applications, including a new version of Lipnowski and Sadler’s (2019) peer-confirming equilibrium.