Breaking the Iron Rice Bowl: Tenure-Track Systems and the Rise of Academic Innovation in China
利用中国高校经济系人事制度改革数据，发现终身教职制教师比传统体制教师每年多发表0.135篇（即100%）高质量期刊论文，该增长源于招募高潜力人才、绩效压力和激励增强。
Abstract This study leverages personnel system reforms within economics departments at Chinese universities to assess the impact of the tenure-track system on research productivity. Using individual-level data on faculty members, we show that tenure-track faculty produce 0.135 (or 100%) more publications in high-quality journals annually during their probationary period compared to faculty hired under the traditional personnel system. Our findings suggest that this increase in productivity is driven by the recruitment of high-potential researchers, heightened pressure due to performance-based employment risks and enhanced incentives, including higher salaries and increased research funding. Moreover, we observe that the varied implementation details influence the actual effects of the reform. Overall, the university tenure-track reform has been a significant contributor to the increased productivity in Chinese economic research.