Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects
研究发现，知情中介通过威胁解雇来压榨员工能力，而员工的工作记录逐渐削弱中介的信息优势，促使中介提前解雇表现好但能力低的员工以加速信息优势下降，从而让留下的员工接受低于保留工资的薪酬以更快建立声誉。
Adverse selection benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates agents’ ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. An agent’s track record gradually reduces intermediary’s information advantage. In response, the intermediary starts churning well-performing agents she knows are less skilled. The accelerated reduction in information advantage boosts profits, as retained agents accept below-reservation wages to build reputation faster. Agents prefer starting their careers working for an intermediary, as benefits from building reputation faster more than offset expropriation costs. Our analysis applies to professions where talent is essential and performance is publicly observable.