The Cost of Investor Protection: Bank Loan Contracting During SEC Investigations
研究发现，当借款公司被美国证券交易委员会调查时，银行会收取更高的贷款利差，且利率上升幅度与贷款人特征相关；对于信用质量差、信息不对称严重或更依赖银行贷款的公司，影响更大。
ABSTRACT In examining the loan contracting implications of SEC investigations, we document that banks charge higher loan spreads when borrowers are under investigation, with the rise in interest rates varying predictably with lender characteristics. Further, our evidence implies that the debt pricing impact of SEC investigations is amplified for borrowers suffering worse credit quality and information asymmetry as well as those relying more on bank loans. These findings suggest that banks perceive increased risk for borrowers under SEC scrutiny while also leveraging their knowledge of the investigations to extract rents. Supplemental analyses reveal tighter nonspread loan terms and a higher likelihood of amending existing loan contracts during SEC investigations. Additionally, the tightening of loan terms reverses for investigations that conclude without enforcement actions. Overall, our research identifies an economic cost of SEC investigations and alerts regulators to these costs when deciding whether to launch an investigation. Data Availability: All data used are available from the sources indicated in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; G21; K22.