Industrial policy conflicts and their impact on analysts' forecast accuracy and behavior
研究发现中央与地方政策冲突时，分析师盈利预测分歧增大、准确性下降，尤其对非本地分析师、低财政自主地区企业和国企影响更显著，分析师会通过增加实地调研、延长报告和频繁修正来应对。
Abstract Policy conflicts can confuse and disrupt information interpretation in capital markets. This study finds that earnings forecast dispersion rises and accuracy declines when central and local government policies conflict. Effects are stronger for non‐local analysts, firms in low fiscal autonomy regions, and state‐owned enterprises. Additional analyses indicate that the findings are linked to both firm‐level and industry‐level uncertainty and are primarily driven by the “effect uncertainty” surrounding policy implementation. Analysts respond by increasing on‐site visits, lengthening reports, and issuing more frequent revisions. Altogether, this article highlights the unintended consequences of government policy on the quality and characteristics of analysts' forecasts.