Taxing the wealthy in Haiti: Evidence from a conjoint experiment on property tax preferences
通过海地财产税改革的联合实验发现，富人在获得同侪公开认可时更支持财产税，而市政当局或外国非政府组织作为征税方会降低支持度，制度信任下降可能是机制。
• Evidence comes from a conjoint experiment of property tax reform in Haiti. • The wealthy support property taxation when they receive public peer recognition. • Support declines for reforms with municipalities or foreign NGOs as tax actors. • A decline in institutional trust may serve as mechanism. • A semi-natural experiment after the 2024 insurrection corroborates results. How can we build support for taxation among the wealthy in fragile conflict-afflicted countries? Haiti, one of the poorest and most unequal societies in the Americas, is highly aid-reliant and lacks tax revenue. From a narrow self-interest perspective, the affluent should become more supportive of property taxation when the tax returns serve their own interest. However, in fragile states that struggle to provide adequate returns and where public goods can also be provided by non-state actors, we also expect broader utility-maximizing motives such as social recognition and the identity of the tax authority to critically define the affluents’ tax support. Support should increase when they receive social recognition, a non-material benefit, for their tax payment and taxes are collected and administered by entities they trust. We test our argument with a conjoint experiment of property tax-related reform proposals in an online survey collected in winter 2023/24 in Haiti, when there was an unexpected gang insurrection. Institutional failure, represented by the gang uprising, erodes the wealthy’s tax support when municipalities are the tax authority. Support for the property tax reform decreases when NGOs are involved. Importantly, the wealthy prefer tax proposals when they receive public recognition from their peer group, a low-cost instrument, and when they know the revenue will benefit the general population, rather than specific groups.