Robust price discrimination
研究了市场设计者在不知道卖家产品估值时，通过披露买家估值信息来最大化买家剩余，发现后悔值不超过最优买家剩余的1/e，且该界限是紧的。
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bounded by a 1 e -fraction of the optimal buyer surplus when the seller has zero valuation for the product. This bound is attained by randomly drawing a seller valuation and applying the segmentation of Bergemann et al. (2015) with respect to the drawn valuation. We show that this bound is tight in the case of binary buyer valuation.