Power contestability among large shareholders and dividend payouts: a sociopolitical perspective
研究了在制度薄弱的环境中，大股东之间的权力竞争如何通过提高股利支付来吸引小投资者，从而改善公司治理，基于台湾860家上市公司1998-2019年的数据验证了假设。
Abstract We extend principal-principal agency theory to explore how large shareholders may improve corporate governance in weak institutions by increasing the firm’s dividend payout to small investors. We highlight a sociopolitical mechanism, arguing that contestable large shareholders tend to woo small investors to win the competition for control of the firm. Consequently, more contestable large shareholders are likely to pay higher dividends, benefiting small investors. Moreover, the impact of large shareholders’ contestability on dividend payouts is more pronounced when they have stronger incentives for competition for control due to high deviation between large shareholders’ cash flow and voting rights, low large shareholders’ divergent interests, and high large shareholders’ instability. Our analysis of 860 publicly listed firms in Taiwan from 1998 to 2019 supports our hypotheses and contributes to the behavioral corporate governance literature regarding ownership structure and dividends.