When Nature Strikes: Which Regimes Exploit Natural Disasters for Fiscal Expansion?
研究分析了166个国家1960至2018年的数据，发现混合政权在严重自然灾害后更可能扩大公共支出以维持合法性，而民主和专制政权则无此现象。
ABSTRACT This study examines how different types of regimes use performance‐based legitimation after severe natural disasters. While prior research has evaluated emergency relief, broader fiscal responses remain understudied. Drawing on legitimation theory, we argue that all regimes seek to secure legitimacy, but hybrid regimes are more likely to expand public spending to ensure their political survival. Analyzing data from 166 countries from 1960 to 2018, we find significant post‐disaster fiscal expansion in hybrid regimes (particularly those with weaker opposition and higher fiscal capacity), but not democracies or autocracies. We investigate three case studies that largely support these findings: the 1985 Algarrobo earthquake (Chile under autocracy), the 1974 Hurricane Fifi‐Orlene (Honduras under a hybrid regime), and the 1999 İzmit earthquake (Turkey during democracy).