Beneficiary investor monitoring and asset manager engagement
研究日本受益投资者（如养老基金）监督资产管理人参与公司治理的效果，发现签署管理守则的资产管理人持股的公司更少采用反收购条款，且条款取消能改善运营和股票表现。
This study examines the impact of monitoring activities of beneficial investors toward asset managers. We use data from Japan, where the stewardship code requires beneficial investors, such as pension funds, to monitor the engagement of asset managers. We provide evidence that firms with asset managers who have endorsed the code are less likely to have anti-takeover provisions, especially after the code revision. Additional analyses clarify the causality by including ownership of non-signatory investors, a matching procedure, and an alternative definition of the ownership variable. We also confirm that the engagement also changes other corporate governance measurements of Japanese listed companies. Finally, we demonstrate that removing such provisions can improve operational and stock performance.