Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment
实验研究证据博弈中，承诺是否影响结果。发现理论上的等价性不成立，承诺会改变结果，且结果符合考虑说谎厌恶的模型预测。
The voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines their payoff, commitment does not matter, as there is a theoretical equivalence between the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretical equivalence, our results indicate that outcomes diverge and that commitment changes the outcomes. Our experimental results are in line with the predictions of a model that accounts for lying-averse agents.