Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts
构建不完全契约模型，比较公私合作与传统采购两种组织形式下政府获取承包商适应成本信息的能力，发现信息获取可能支持或削弱公私合作的理由。
We develop an incomplete-contracting model in which the government engages a private contractor to provide a public good. Over time, adaptations of the good to changing circumstances may become desirable. The contractor privately learns the costs of implementing these adaptations. We compare two organizational forms. In a public–private partnership, the government actively participates in project management and, by incurring information-gathering costs, may ascertain the contractor’s adaptation costs. Under traditional procurement, the government lacks direct involvement in project management, preventing it from ascertaining the adaptation costs. We show that the government’s potentially enhanced access to the contractor’s information in a public–private partnership can either support or undermine the case for such partnerships. • The government engages a private contractor to provide a public good. • The contractor privately learns the costs of implementing adaptations. • In traditional procurement, the government cannot learn the adaptation costs. • In a partnership, the government may engage in costly information gathering. • The possibility of information gathering can help or hurt the case for partnerships.