Participation of Variable Renewable Generators in Forward Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
研究了可再生能源发电机是否应参与远期市场，发现其参与加剧远期竞争但增强传统发电机在现货市场的势力，可能导致“一赢多输”局面，并分析了优先调度的影响。
This paper addresses the pressing question of whether renewable generators (RGs) should participate in forward markets, traditionally used by conventional generators (CGs) to hedge against spot market risks. We develop a stylized game-theoretical model that captures hybrid generation technologies, demand and supply uncertainties, and increasing demand-side engagement in today’s electricity markets. Our analysis reveals that the forward participation of prioritized RGs intensifies competition in the forward markets but inadvertently bolsters CGs’ market power in the spot markets. This dynamic may create a “one wins, many lose” outcome, where RGs benefit at the expense of consumer surplus, social welfare, and other stakeholders. Additionally, priority dispatch incentivizes RGs to contract more aggressively than CGs. Although allowing RGs to withhold output can mitigate these adverse effects, numerical results indicate that priority dispatch ultimately yields greater social benefits. Sensitivity analysis further shows that RGs’ forward participation can reshape how market factors influence market equilibrium.