Discretion of public appointments in Mexico: A review of organizational arrangements in subnational appointments
研究了墨西哥24个次国家级公共任命中组织安排的质量如何影响任命结果，发现组织安排缺失或质量低会加剧自由裁量权，导致庇护或混合结果，而地方参与和数字创新是影响感知结果的关键因素。
Public appointments (PAs) are tools with the potential to transform and legitimize institutions. They can promote governance based on integrity and fairness yet may be subject to patronage due to high discretion vested in appointing authorities. The literature on this topic in Latin America is limited, with little focus on the subnational level. Democratic theories assessing appointment effects on legitimacy and trust in public institutions are lacking. Recent research has deepened the effect of organizational arrangements (OAs) as key procedural mechanisms to constrain discretion. However, their measurement remains unresolved. This study develops an instrument to measure the quality of OAs in PAs called the Evaluation System of Organizational Arrangements, aiming to understand the influence of OAs on the perceived outcome of 24 subnational PAs in Mexico. A documentary review of official documentation and cross-case analysis showed that the inexistence or low quality of OAs increases PAs’ discretionality, affecting governance perception and leading to patronage or hybrid outcomes. Local stakeholder engagement and digital innovation were the most relevant factors influencing perceived outcomes, followed by transparency and independent scrutiny. The analysis of perceived outcomes allowed us to characterize governance, hybrid and patronage appointments. These findings open new research pathways on the specific conditions that enable governance PAs.