Partial passive ownership holdings destabilizing collusion
在古诺双寡头市场中，研究发现一家企业持有对手的被动股份会破坏合谋稳定性，除非该企业的谈判能力足够强；这对反垄断政策有重要启示。
In a homogenous good Cournot duopoly with linear demand, we demonstrate that partial passive ownership (PPO) holdings destabilize collusion as long as the bargaining power of the firm that owns stakes in its rival is not too high. Notably, if both firms have equal bargaining power during their negotiations over the surplus generated by collusion, an increase in PPO holdings always makes collusion less stable. Our findings have important policy implications for antitrust authorities. • In a homogenous good Cournot duopoly one firm owns passive shares in its rival. • An increase in the shares of the owning firm may destabilize tacit collusion. • This holds when its bargaining power in the negotiations over the collusive surplus is not too high. • The effect of Partial Passive Ownership (PPO) on collusion crucially depends on the prevalent collusive-sharing rule. • Our findings have important implications for antitrust policy.