Going for Broke: Bank Reputation and the Performance of Opaque Securities
研究了18世纪荷兰银行合伙制下，银行声誉能否提升不透明证券（如抵押贷款支持证券）的质量，发现高声誉银行发行的证券在市场崩溃时平均多保留17.5%的价值，但声誉效应在合伙人因婚姻致富或短期获利时减弱。
ABSTRACT Can banks’ reputational concerns improve the quality of opaque, off‐balance sheet securities, such as mortgage‐backed securities? We study this question in a uniquely parsimonious setting. In the 1760s, Dutch banking partnerships securitized West‐Indian plantation mortgages that were risky and opaque. High‐reputation banks originated better mortgages and issued securities that, on average, retained 17.5% more of their value during a market collapse. Reputational effects are attenuated when the managing partners were married into wealth or received a large share of profits in the short term, suggesting that bank reputation only works if bankers are personally exposed to (long‐run) reputational losses.