Mitigation, Adaptation and Cooperation in Response to Climate Disaster
通过跨边界污染微分博弈模型，分析了减缓与适应在应对不可逆气候灾难中的权衡，发现社会最优下适应补充减缓，但非合作均衡中适应会挤占减缓并降低预期福利。
Abstract We analyze the tradeoff between mitigation and adaptation in response to irreversible climate disaster in a transboundary pollution differential game with a stochastic regime shift. Countries can reduce their emissions to decrease the likelihood that the shift occurs, or proactively invest in adaptation to reduce the impact of the shift. We characterize the social optimum and the non-cooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). In the social optimum, adaptation complements mitigation and increases expected welfare. In contrast, in the MPNE the option to adapt crowds out mitigation, reduces precautionary behavior, and decreases expected welfare. Our analysis stresses the importance of strategic interactions when countries can use multiple policy instruments to combat climate change.