Nash solutions for bargaining problems with a reference point
研究了参考点对讨价还价结果的影响，在纳什四个原始公理基础上加入两个新公理，推导出约束纳什讨价还价解和r-纳什讨价还价解，并给出了分歧解的公理化刻画。
We explore the implications of the presence of a reference point on bargaining outcomes. We consider Nash’s four original axioms with two additional axioms making use of the reference point: equal direction of changes and invariance with respect to the Shalev transformation (Shalev invariance). Because any solution that satisfies Pareto efficiency, scale invariance, contraction independence, and the two new axioms must be independent of the disagreement point when the reference point is feasible, we propose two notions of symmetry and derive two different solutions: the constrained Nash bargaining solution and the r-Nash bargaining solution. In addition to our main results, we include an axiomatic characterization of the disagreement solution.